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EVALUATING EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY IN CRIMINAL
TRIALS: CAN JURORS USE HELP FROM EXPERTS?
United States v. Downing
753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985)
INTRODUCTION
In the late 1970's, one Ronald Quick was tried twice in the Kansas
courts and convicted of aggravated robbery of a liquor store. At both
trials two eyewitnesses positively identified the defendant as the perpetra-
tor of the crime. The two convictions were reversed for trial errors. I The
case was dismissed during the third trial after another man who looked
like the defendant confessed to the crime.2
The miscarriage of justice that Ronald Quick suffered is not an iso-
lated example. Commentators have extensively documented wrongful
convictions resulting from mistaken identifications,3 and the courts have
long recognized the unreliability of eyewitness identifications. 4 Yet, de-
l. State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979); and 229 Kan. 117, 621 P.2d 997
(1981).
2. The Quick case and its final disposition are noted in State v. Warren, 230 Kan. 385, 392,
635 P.2d 1236, 1241 (1981). Similarly, the court in Warren notes the following unreported case. In
1979, Rev. Bernard T. Pagano, a Roman Catholic priest, was charged with the robberies of six
Delaware stores in the winter of 1978. At the trial, he was falsely identified by several prosecution
witnesses as the robber. After the State rested its case, the prosecution was dismissed on motion of
the State because another man confessed to the crimes. Id.
3. See, e.g., E. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (1932) (discusses sixty-five convic-
tions of innocent defendants, twenty-nine of which resulted from the erroneous identification of the
accused by the victim of a violent crime); F. FRANKFURTER, THE CASE OF SACCO AND VANZETTI:
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS FOR LAWYERS AND LAYMEN (1927). See generally P. WALL, EYEWITNESS
IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES (1965). Wall's book, in which he called for reform in identifi-
cation procedures in criminal cases, is a classic work on the subject. As one recent book noted,
"Ever since the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Wade [388 U.S. 218, 229 (1967)]
took note of Wall's book on eyewitness identification, literature on the subject has come forth in a
flood." E. ARNOLDS, W. CARROLL, M. LEWIS, & M. SENG, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: STRATE-
GIES AND TACTICS at v (1984) [hereinafter STRATEGIES AND TACTICS].
Legal commentators who advocate the use of expert testimony on eyewitness identification in
criminal trials have unearthed interesting evidence to support their position. For example, one com-
mentator relates the following experiment:
A judge in New York City developed his own system to check on the frequency of mis-
taken identifications. In ten cases in which the identification of the accused was virtually
the only evidence, the judge permitted defense attorneys to seat a look-alike alongside the
defendant. In only two of the ten cases was the witness able to identify the defendant.
Note, Did Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert Psychological Testimony on the Unreliability of Eyewitness
Identification, 29 STAN. L. REV. 969, 969 n.3 (1977) (citing TIME, April 2, 1973, at 59).
4. See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967) where the Court stated: "The
vagaries of eyewitness identification are well-known; the annals of criminal law are rife with in-
stances of mistaken identification."
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spite attempts by the United States Supreme Court to establish constitu-
tional safeguards governing the admission of eyewitness identifications in
federal and state criminal trials,5 the problem of unreliable identifications
persists.
6
One method of alleviating the problem is the use at trial of expert
testimony on the unreliability of eyewitness identifications. Although
many defense lawyers and commentators vigorously advocate this
method, 7 the overwhelming majority of state and federal appellate courts
have upheld the exclusion of such expert testimonyA In United States v.
5. These constitutional safeguards protecting defendants from erroneous and impermissibly
suggestive identifications are beyond the scope of this Comment. Briefly, the landmark Wade tril-
ogy, decided by the Supreme Court in 1967, established a constitutional right to have counsel present
at certain "critical stages" of a criminal prosecution, including pre-trial lineups. United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S.
293 (1967). However, subsequent decisions of the Court, particularly Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682
(1972) and United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973), have seriously undermined the effectiveness of
the protections set up by the Wade trilogy. Commentators have expressed this erosion in blunter
terms. "The right to counsel at identification procedures established in Wade has become virtually a
dead letter owing to two decisions." N. SOBEL, EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION: LEGAL AND PRAC-
TICAL PROBLEMS § 1.5, at 1-10 (2d ed. 1981 and 1985 rev.) (referring to Kirby and Ash). For
detailed analyses of the Supreme Court's constitutional decisions in this area, see N. SOBEL, supra,
§§ 1-2 and Note, supra note 3, at 989-1000.
The fact that the Court has virtually eliminated the constitutional safeguards provided in the
Wade trilogy is one of the reasons commentators advance in advocating the use of expert testimony
on eyewitness identifications at trial. See, e.g., Note, supra note 3, at 999-1000. Furthermore, Wade
and subsequent Supreme Court decisions primarily address the problem of suggestive police proce-
dures, not the inherent limitations of witnesses' perception and memory. See id.
6. In a recent decision, the Supreme Court of Kansas, after reviewing the literature on the
subject and the steps taken in other countries to correct the injustices resulting from mistaken identi-
fications, stated:
In spite of the great volume of articles on the subject of eyewitness testimony by legal
writers and the great deal of scientific research by psychologists in recent years, the courts
in this country have been slow to take the problem seriously and, until recently, have not
taken effective steps to confront it .... [C]ases of mistaken identification are not infrequent
and the problem of misidentification has not been alleviated.
State v. Warren, 230 Kan. 385, 392, 635 P.2d 1236, 1241 (1981). The court concluded that the
answer to the problem is not the use of expert testimony at trial, but rather a cautionary instruction
to the jury which sets forth the factors to be considered in evaluating eyewitness testimony. Id. at
397, 635 P.2d at 1243.
7. See, e.g., STRATEGIES AND TACTICS, supra note 3, § 8.01-8.20; N. SOBEL, supra note 5,
§§ 9.6-9.8; Note, supra note 3; see also Johnson, Cross-Racial Identification Errors in Criminal Cases,
69 CORNELL L. REV. 934 (1984) (author concludes that while expert testimony is not a perfect
solution to the problem of cross-racial identification errors, judicial reluctance to admit such testi-
mony is unwarranted). But see Note, Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Identification: Invading the
Province of the Jury?, 26 ARIZ. L. REV. 399 (1984) (author concludes that the limited benefits of
expert testimony are substantially outweighed by its potential harm); Comment, Unreliable Eyewit-
ness Evidence: The Expert Psychologist and the Defense in Criminal Cases, 45 LA. L. REV. 721, 744
(1985) (author acknowledges that "a number of psychologists and some legal commentators" advo-
cate the use of such expert testimony at trial, but concludes that, while psychologists can assist the
defense in a criminal case in a number of ways, such assistance should not take the form of expert
testimony at trial).
No citation is necessary to support the proposition that defense attorneys, not prosecutors, are
fighting for the admissibility of expert testimony on eyewitness identification.
8. Some of the more recent decisions include the following: United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d
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Downing,9 an appeal from a criminal conviction, the Third Circuit joined
a minority of jurisdictions which have approved the introduction of such
testimony. 10 Downing held that under the "helpfulness" test set forth in
Federal Rule of Evidence 702,11 expert testimony on eyewitness percep-
tion and memory is admissible "at least in some circumstances."', 2 The
Third Circuit announced a new standard for the evaluation of novel sci-
entific evidence, such as the expert testimony at issue in the case.13 It
instructed the trial court to conduct a preliminary hearing to determine
whether, under the appellate court's new standard, the expert testimony
616, 641 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982); United States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381, 383 (1st
Cir. 1979); United States v. Watson, 587 F.2d 365, 369 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1132
(1979); United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 1048, 1054 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1100
(1977); United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1973); State v. Warren, 230 Kan.
385, 635 P.2d 1236 (1981). For a more exhaustive list of federal and state appellate decisions finding
no abuse of discretion in the trial court's exclusion of the proffered testimony, see Note, supra note 7,
at 400 n.12.
9. 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985).
10. State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, 660 P.2d 1208 (1983) (holding that it was an abuse of
discretion to preclude the expert testimony under the circumstances of this case); People v. McDon-
ald, 37 Cal. 3d 351, 690 P.2d 709, 208 Cal. Rptr. 236 (1984) (same); see also United States v. Smith,
736 F.2d 1103 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 868 (1984) (where trial court excluded the proffered
expert testimony, appellate court held that error, if any, was harmless; however, appellate court in
clear dicta indicated that it approved of the admissibility of such testimony in appropriate circum-
stances).
After Downing was decided, another jurisdiction adopted the minority view approving of the
use of such expert testimony at trial. In State v. Buell, 22 Ohio St. 3d 124, 489 N.E.2d 795 (1986),
the Ohio Supreme Court held that the expert testimony of an experimental psychologist concerning
the factors that may impair the accuracy of a typical eyewitness is admissible under Ohio's counter-
part to Federal Rule of Evidence 702. 22 Ohio St. 3d 124, 131, 489 N.E.2d 795, 803. The court also
held that expert testimony regarding "the credibility of the identification testimony of a particular
witness is inadmissible, . . . absent a showing that the witness suffers from a mental or physical
impairment which would affect the witness' ability to observe or recall events." Id. at 133, 489
N.E.2d at 804 (emphasis in original). These holdings are in accord with the decisions in Downing,
Chapple, McDonald, and Smith, which the court in Buell expressly followed. Id. at 132, 489 N.E.2d
at 801-03. However, the court in Buell held that the exclusion of the proffered testimony was not an
abuse of discretion because "the evidence of defendant's guilt was based primarily on physical evi-
dence rather than identification testimony." Id. at 133, 489 N.E.2d at 804.
11. FED. R. EvID. 702 states: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise." The Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 702 states in pertinent part:
Whether the situation is a proper one for the use of expert testimony is to be determined on
the basis of assisting the trier. "There is no more certain test for determining when experts
may be used than the common sense inquiry whether the untrained layman would be quali-
fied to determine intelligently and to the best possible degree the particular issue without
enlightenment from those having a specialized understanding of the subject involved in the
dispute." Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 Vand. L. Rev. 414, 418 (1952). When opinions are
excluded, it is because they are unhelpful and therefore superfluous and a waste of time. 7
Wigmore § 1918.
The Federal Rules of Evidence are referred to herein as the Federal Rules or the Rules.
12. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1232.
13. Id. at 1232-43.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
should be admitted in Downing. 14
This Comment will review the case law representing the traditional
view that expert testimony on eyewitness identifications is inadmissible.
It will explore the reasons for this judicial reluctance, despite the large
body of scientific research on the subject and the potential benefits to the
administration of criminal justice that such expert testimony offers. This
analysis will demonstrate that the Third Circuit's approach is consistent
with the Federal Rules of Evidence and represents a significant and effec-
tive step toward alleviating the problem of mistaken identifications and
wrongful convictions. Finally, it will be shown that the Third Circuit
goes beyond prior case law that also approved the admission of expert
psychological testimony, in that Downing sets forth a flexible and worka-
ble standard for the evaluation of "novel" types of scientific evidence.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The Expert Testimony
Before turning to the case law on the subject of expert testimony on
eyewitness identifications, a brief overview of the experts' qualifications
and the substance of their testimony is necessary. The experts typically
hold doctoral degrees in psychology and are experts in the fields of
human perception, memory and recall. They are sometimes referred to
as cognitive psychologists. In all the cases reviewed, the prosecution did
not challenge the qualifications of the expert. That is, the prosecution
typically concedes that the proffered witness is an expert in the field of
perception and memory but argues that the subject matter is not a proper
one for expert testimony.
Not coincidentally, defendants' efforts to present the expert testi-
mony to the trier of fact have been accompanied by a growing body of
professional literature on the subjects of human perception and memory,
and the unreliability of eyewitness identifications.15 Basically, the psy-
14. On remand, the trial court conducted the required evidentiary hearing. The court carefully
followed the Third Circuit's guidelines and concluded that the proffered testimony should not be
admitted. Therefore, in accord with the appellate court's instructions, the trial court reinstated the
judgment of conviction and affirmed the court's prior sentence of defendant. United States v. Down-
ing, 609 F. Supp. 784 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd mem., 780 F.2d 1017 (3d Cir. 1985).
15. The acknowledged leader in the field, Dr. Elizabeth Loftus, estimates that over 85% of the
published literature on the psychology of eyewitness identification has surfaced since 1978, although
the earliest research on the subject dates back to 1908. Wells & Loftus, Eyewitness Research Then
and Now, in EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 1, 3 (1984) [hereinafter
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES]. In addition to that book, the following works discuss the results
of scientific research on the subject: STRATEGIES AND TACTICS, supra note 3; E. LOFTUS, EYEWIT-
NESS TESTIMONY (1979); THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EVIDENCE AND TRIAL PROCEDURE (S. Kassin &
L. Wrightsman eds. 1985); N. SOBEL, supra note 5. See also Note, Did Your Eyes Deceive You?
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chologists and lawyers who advocate the use of this expert testimony at
trial advance two main points: first, that jurors give eyewitness testi-
mony undue weight, even in the face of substantial evidence discrediting
that testimony,1 6 and second, that experts can present to the jury factors
bearing on eyewitness identification which "may be known only to some
jurors, or may be imperfectly understood by many, or may be contrary to
the intuitive beliefs of most.'
' 7
Some of the factors which, according to psychological tests and re-
search, affect human perception and memory are the following: (1) the
"forgetting curve," which indicates that forgetting occurs rapidly and
then tends to level out and that therefore immediate identification is
much more trustworthy than delayed identification; (2) "unconscious
transfer," which occurs when the witness confuses a person seen in one
situation with a person seen in a different situation; (3) "post-event infor-
mation," which occurs when a witness talks to others about the incident,
and then incorporates new information into his reconstruction of the in-
cident; (4) the effects of stress upon perception: some psychologists
maintain that, contrary to what most laymen believe, stress causes inac-
curacy of perception; (5) contrary to laymen's intuitive beliefs, some
studies indicate that there is no relationship between an eyewitness's con-
fidence in his identification and the accuracy of that identification; and
(6) the "own-race effect," which indicates that persons of one race have
Expert Psychological Testimony on the Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification, 29 STAN. L. REV.
969, 1005-30 (1977).
It should be noted that not all psychologists active in this field advocate the use of expert
testimony at trial. The principal critics of the approach taken by Dr. Loftus and others are Drs.
Egeth and McCloskey. See Egeth & McCloskey, Expert Testimony About Eyewitness Behavior: Is It
Safe and Effective?, in PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra, at 283. These two psychologists
maintain that insufficient research has been conducted to conclude that expert psychological testi-
mony would improve jurors' ability to evaluate eyewitness testimony, and that it is possible that the
testimony would have detrimental effects. Id. at 301. In People v. McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d 351, 369
n.15, 690 P.2d 709, 721 n.15, 208 Cal. Rptr. 236, 248 n.15 (1984), the California Supreme Court
characterized the view of Egeth and McCloskey as a minority view within the psychological
community.
16. As one court recently expressed it, "because eyewitness testimony is such powerful stuff and
can decide a case on its own strength, it can blind a jury to other exculpatory evidence or infer-
ences." Kampshoff v. Smith, 698 F.2d 581, 587 (2d Cir. 1983). In Kampshoff, the court held that
the erroneous admission of certain eyewitness testimony was reversible error. (It was conceded that
the identification testimony had been unconstitutionally obtained.) The eyewitness was twelve years
old at the time of the crime and had seen the offender from a distance of about 130 feet. It was clear
from the circumstances that the eyewitness's identification was actually based on two television
broadcasts in which defendant's picture was televised as that of a suspect in the crime; the police had
asked the eyewitness to view those broadcasts. The court rejected the argument that the admission
of this testimony was harmless error because it merely corroborated the testimony of an accomplice,
noting that "eyewitness testimony is among the most influential, even as it is among the least relia-
ble, forms of proof." Id.
17. People v. McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d 351, 368, 690 P.2d 709, 720, 208 Cal. Rptr. 236, 247
(1984).
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difficulty accurately identifying persons of another race.18
The proffered expert would not render an opinion that a particular
eyewitness's testimony is unreliable. Rather, the expert would present to
the jury scientific data on one or more of the factors outlined above. The
goal is to provide the jurors with information which may assist them in
evaluating a witness's testimony. 19
The Federal Rules of Evidence and "Novel" Scientific Evidence
Article VII of the Federal Rules of Evidence20 addresses the admis-
sibility of opinions and expert testimony. 2t Rule 702 and the Advisory
Committee's Note22 make it clear that the test for admissibility of expert
testimony is whether that testimony will assist the trier of fact. Even
before the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, helpfulness to the
trier of fact was seen as an essential condition of admissibility. 23 In ad-
dressing the admissibility of expert testimony, courts often note that the
guiding principle is the question posed by Wigmore: "On this subject can
a jury from thisperson receive appreciable help?" 24 In addition, Rule 704
provides: "Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise
admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to
be decided by the trier of fact."' 25 Rule 704 thus abolished the so-called
18. For more detailed explanations of these factors, see PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra
note 15. A concise list of these and other factors, including references to the relevant psychological
studies, is found in Greene, Schooler & Loftus, Expert Psychological Testimony, in THE PSYCHOL-
OGY OF EVIDENCE AND TRIAL PROCEDURE 201, 204-20 (1985). See also Johnson, Cross-Racial
Identification Errors in Criminal Cases, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 934 (1984) for a thorough discussion
of the "own-race effect." For convenience, expert testimony of psychologists on the unreliability of
eyewitness identification is referred to herein as expert psychological testimony.
19. See People v. McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d 351, 362, 690 P.2d 709, 716, 208 Cal. Rptr. 236, 243
(1984).
20. FED. R. EVID. 701-706.
21. Many states have enacted evidence rules identical or substantially similar to the Federal
Rules of Evidence. The multi-volume treatise by Judge Weinstein and Professor Berger presents an
exhaustive survey of the case law under each Federal Rule of Evidence and under the states' counter-
parts to the Federal Rules. J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE (1985). The two
principal state court decisions to be discussed herein are State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, 660 P.2d
1208 (1983) and People v. McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d 351, 690 P.2d 709, 208 Cal. Rptr. 236 (1984).
Arizona has adopted Federal Rule of Evidence 702 verbatim; the counterpart rule in California is
substantially the same as Federal Rule 702.
22. See supra note 11.
23. 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 702[01], at 702-7 (1985) (cita-
tions omitted).
24. 7 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1923 (Chadbourn rev. 1978) (emphasis in original). See, e.g.,
United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1973) ("general test regarding the admissibil-
ity of expert testimony is whether the jury can receive 'appreciable help' from such testimony").
25. FED. R. EViD. 704. The Advisory Committee's Note to the Rule gives the following as
examples of ultimate issues: intoxication, speed, handwriting, and value. The Advisory Committee
Note further states:
The abolition of the ultimate issue rule does not lower the bars so as to admit all opinions.
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ultimate issue rule, which barred opinion testimony on an ultimate issue
to be decided by the jury.
There is no disagreement that the test governing the admissibility of
expert testimony is whether that testimony will assist the trier of fact.
However, special problems arise when a party seeks to introduce so-
called novel scientific evidence, such as expert psychological testimony,
because the Federal Rules are silent on novel scientific evidence.26 Prior
to the adoption of the Federal Rules, many courts used the test set forth
in Frye v. United States.27 Under the Frye test, the underlying scientific
principle or discovery "must be sufficiently established to have gained
general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs."
'28
There is considerable debate over whether the Frye "general accept-
ance test" survived (or should survive) the enactment of the Federal
Rules. As the Downing court observed, because the Frye test was the
dominant view among the federal courts at the time the Rules were
drafted, "one might expect that the rules themselves would make some
pronouncement about the continuing vitality of the [Frye] standard.
' 29
However, neither the text of the Rules nor the accompanying notes set
forth a standard for determining the admissibility of novel scientific evi-
dence. Commentators agree that this legislative silence is significant, but
they disagree about its meaning. 30 A number of the circuit courts of ap-
peals have rejected the Frye standard since the enactment of the Federal
Under Rules 701 and 702, opinions must be helpful to the trier of fact, and Rule 403
provides for exclusion of evidence which wastes time. These provisions afford ample assur-
ances against the admission of opinions which would merely tell the jury what result to
reach, somewhat in the manner of the oath-helpers of an earlier day.
FED. R. EvID. 704 advisory committee's note, reprinted in FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR
UNITED STATES COURTS AND MAGISTRATES, Rule 704, at 95 (West 1984).
26. The underlying scientific principle of some scientific evidence-for example, fingerprint and
x-ray evidence-is so well-established that the evidence is readily admissible, provided the witness
who is to testify qualifies as an expert. See United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1234 (3d Cir.
1985). Examples of novel scientific evidence include evidence on the rape trauma syndrome, the
battered woman syndrome, and voice identification. See generally Greene, Schooler, & Loftus, Ex-
pert Psychological Testimony, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EVIDENCE A'ND TRIAL PROCEDURE 201
(1985) (discussing the rape trauma and battered woman syndromes, as well as eyewitness
identifications).
27. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
28. Id. at 1014. The defendant in Frye sought to introduce test results from a machine that was
an early version of the modem polygraph. The court excluded the evidence under its newly an-
nounced standard, and the defendant was convicted. He was subsequently pardoned when someone
else confessed to the crime. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United
States, a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1204 n.42 (1980).
29. 753 F.2d at 1234.
30. One group of commentators interprets the legislative silence as an implicit adoption of the
Frye test. See, e.g., S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 452
(3d ed. 1982) ("It would be odd if the Advisory Committee and the Congress intended to overrule
the vast majority of cases excluding such evidence as lie detectors without explicitly stating so.").
Other commentators have reached the opposite conclusion. See, e.g., 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BER-
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Rules of Evidence, but an apparently equal number of circuits continue
to adhere to it or to a variation of it. I' Some courts have rejected the use
of expert testimony on eyewitness identification on the ground that it
fails to meet the Frye test. 32 Generally, jurisdictions which follow Frye
find that such expert testimony is not based on a generally accepted ex-
planatory theory, although one court which does follow Frye appeared to
reach the opposite conclusion.
33
Whether a jurisdiction follows the Frye test or some other standard
appears to be of less significance in a court's determination to admit or
exclude expert testimony on eyewitness identification than formerly.
One commentator, after reviewing the four recent decisions approving
the admission of such expert testimony, 34 observed that "[iut begins to
appear that arguments over the admission of eyewitness expert testimony
may now begin to focus not on the scientific worth of the testimony in
general but on its probative force and its prejudicial effect in each
case." 3
5
The Case Law Prior to Downing
Criminal defendants, particularly in cases where the primary evi-
dence against them is eyewitness testimony, have in recent years increas-
ingly urged trial courts to permit the introduction of expert testimony on
the unreliability of eyewitness identifications. Trial courts have admitted
GER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 702[03], at 702-16 (1985) ("The silence of [Rule 702] and its draft-
ers should be regarded as tantamount to an abandonment of the general acceptance standard.").
For an excellent analysis of the Frye test, including the problems with it, its advantages, and
proposed solutions, see Giannelli, supra note 28. See also Note, supra note 3, at 1021-23 (author
criticizes the Frye test, noting that "courts have applied it quite selectively, if somewhat inconsis-
tently due to difficulties in distinguishing scientific evidence from other expert testimony, in deciding
to which particular field of science the evidence belongs and in determining a standard for 'general
acceptance.' " Id. at 1022. [Footnotes omitted]).
31. See the decisions catalogued in 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE
702[03] nn. 7-8. Because the courts vary in their formulations of the applicable test, it is not
possible to arrive at an exact number of which circuits accept or reject the Frye test.
32. See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 587 F.2d 365, 369 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1132 (1979) (affirmed the exclusion of expert testimony on the difficulty of cross-racial identifications
because the scientific field was inadequately developed).
33. In United States v. Smith, 736 F.2d 1103 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 868 (1984), the
court held that even if it were error to exclude expert testimony on eyewitness identification, such
error was harmless. The court remarked that "[t]he day may have arrived ... when [the expert's]
testimony can be said to conform to a generally accepted explanatory theory." Id. at 1107.
34. United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985); United States v. Smith, 736 F.2d
1103 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 868 (1984); State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, 660 P.2d 1208
(1983); People v. McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d 351, 690 P.2d 709, 208 Cal. Rptr. 236 (1984). For the
holdings of the latter three decisions, see supra note 10.
35. N. SOBEL, supra note 5, § 9.6(b), at 9-30.2. See also Note, supra note 3, at 1022 ("In fact,
recent cases on expert testimony seem to ignore the Frye test altogether and to apply only the re-
quirements of proper subject matter and qualified expert." [Footnotes omitted]).
EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY "
such testimony in a number of cases.3 6 Thus, the virtual unanimity of
appellate court decisions affirming the exclusion of expert psychological
testimony is somewhat misleading, since it suggests that the holding of
Downing and the few decisions like it represent a truly unprecedented
position, which is simply not the case. Nevertheless, it is true that until
1983, when State v. Chapple37 was decided, no reviewing court, state or
federal, had reversed the trial court's exclusion of proffered expert
testimony.
Several interrelated reasons have been given by appellate courts in
holding that the exclusion of expert testimony was not reversible error.
The primary rationale appears to be that the subject of the opinion of-
fered is not beyond the knowledge and experience of the average juror. 38
Thus, the expert testimony would invade the province of the jury. The
invasion of the province of the jury rationale is based upon the premise
that it is solely the province of the trier of fact to determine the eyewit-
ness's credibility and his ability to perceive and recall.39
Other reasons courts have given for excluding the testimony are that
it would not assist the jury in determining the issue of identification; that
the jury is capable of assessing reliability, given the help of cross-exami-
nation and cautionary instructions, without the aid of expert testimony;
that the expert testimony may be unfairly prejudicial because of its aura
of reliability; and that the testimony's probative value is outweighed by
its potential for prejudice. 4° As noted above, some courts rely on the
Frye test to exclude the evidence. 4' Finally (and predictably enough), the
"floodgates" argument and the prospect of a "battle of the experts" in
every criminal trial have been given as grounds for affirming the exclu-
36. A few reported appellate court decisions note that the defendant's expert was permitted to
testify at trial. United States v. Booth, 669 F.2d 1231, 1240 (9th Cir. 1981); People v. Brown, 110
I11. App. 3d 1125, 1129, 443 N.E.2d 665, 668 (1982). See also State v. Warren, 230 Kan. 385, 395,
635 P.2d 1236, 1243 (1981), where the court noted that in the case before it, when the expert testi-
mony of Dr. Elizabeth Loftus was proffered by the defense, her affidavit stated that she had person-
ally been allowed to testify before judges and juries in more than thirty-four cases in various states.
Her affidavit also stated that another expert, Dr. Robert Buckhout, had been permitted to testify in
more than twenty state court trials on the subject.
37. 135 Ariz. 281, 660 P.2d 1208 (1983).
38. See, e.g., United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 641 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825
(1982); United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1973).
39. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 1048, 1054 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1100 (1977); United States v. Brown, 501 F.2d 146, 150 (9th Cir. 1974), rev'don other grounds
sub nom. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975). Cf. People v. Johnson, 38 Cal. App. 3d 1,
112 Cal. Rptr. 834 (1974), overruled by People v. McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d 351, 370-71, 690 P.2d 709,
722, 208 Cal. Rptr. 236, 249 (1984) (the court in McDonald expressly rejected the Johnson court's
invading-the-province-of-the-jury rationale for the exclusion of expert testimony on eyewitness
identification).
40. See, e.g., United States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381 (1st Cir. 1979).
41. See supra note 32.
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sion of the expert testimony.4 2
State v. Chapple 43 was the first decision at the appellate level to hold
that the trial court had abused its discretion in refusing to admit the
testimony of an expert on eyewitness identification. Chapple involved
three drug-related murders; the two eyewitnesses who testified for the
State had been involved in the drug transaction and at the time had rea-
son to fear that they would be victims as well. The eyewitness testimony
was the only evidence offered against the defendant. The first time the
eyewitnesses identified the defendant from a photograph was a year after
the crime, although they had been shown the defendant's photograph
several times previously.
The Supreme Court of Arizona reversed the conviction and re-
manded. The court stated that it could not assume that the average juror
would be aware of the factors about which the expert was qualified to
testify. 44 Thus, the court held that under the helpfulness test of Rule
702, the proffered evidence was a proper subject for expert testimony and
should have been admitted in this case.45 However, the court attempted
to limit its holding to the "peculiar facts" of the case, which included the
considerable stress on the eyewitnesses at the time of the crime, the
length of time that had elapsed between the crime and the photographic
identifications and the possibility that the perception of the eyewitnesses
was impaired due to their use of drugs on the day of the crime. The
court emphasized that in the "usual case" (which it did not define), the
rule would continue to be that the supreme court would support the trial
court's discretionary ruling on the admissibility of expert psychological
testimony.46
Similarly, in 1984, the California Supreme Court in People v. Mc-
Donald47 reversed a criminal conviction, holding that the trial court
abused its discretion in excluding defendant's proffered expert testimony
42. United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 641 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982)
(admitting such testimony would "open the door to a barrage of marginally relevant psychological
evidence").
43. 135 Ariz. 281, 660 P.2d 1208 (1983).
44. Id. at 294, 660 P.2d at 1221.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 297, 660 P.2d at 1224.
47. 37 Cal. 3d 351, 690 P.2d 709, 208 Cal. Rptr. 236 (1984). The precise holding of the court is
as follows:
When an eyewitness identification of the defendant is a key element of the prosecution's
case but is not substantially corroborated by evidence giving it independent reliability, and
the defendant offers qualified expert testimony on specific psychological factors shown by
the record that could have affected the accuracy of the identification but are not likely to be
fully known to or understood by the jury, it will ordinarily be error to exclude that
testimony.
Id. at 377, 690 P.2d at 727, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 254.
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on eyewitness identification. The defendant was convicted of murder and
sentenced to death. The principal issue at trial was the identity of the
offender; the State's case consisted solely of eyewitness testimony. The
trial court, basing its decision on People v. Johnson ,48 concluded that to
allow the expert to testify would be an invasion of the province of the
jury.
4 9
In a lengthy opinion, the California Supreme Court carefully ana-
lyzed each rationale articulated in People v. Johnson, and found each no
longer persuasive in light of the scientific literature on the subject 5° and
the standard for admissibility of expert testimony under the state's Evi-
dence Code.51 The court also emphasized that, in McDonald, identifica-
tion was the crucial issue and the case was very close. 52
In addition to Arizona and California, prior to Downing, two other
jurisdictions had indicated that it may be an abuse of discretion to ex-
clude expert psychological testimony.53 Thus, at the time Downing was
decided, a small minority of jurisdictions had rather abruptly departed
from the previously unanimous view on this testimony. The Third Cir-
cuit in Downing was the first circuit court of appeals to squarely hold that
the district court erred in its conclusion that expert psychological testi-
mony is never admissible.
UNITED STA TES V DOWNING
FACTS OF THE CASE
Defendant John Downing was indicted for mail fraud, wire fraud,
48. 38 Cal. App. 3d 1, 112 Cal. Rptr. 834 (1974).
49. People v. McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d 351, 362-63, 690 P.2d 709, 716, 208 Cal. Rptr. 236, 243
(1985). The trial court did not publish an opinion.
50. The court pointed to the proliferation of empirical studies on the subject, noting that in
recent years at least five treatises discussing "literally scores of studies on the pitfalls of [eyewitness]
identification" have been published. The court concluded that "[t]he consistency of the results of
these studies is impressive, and the courts can no longer remain oblivious to their implications for
the administration of justice." Id. at 365-66, 690 P.2d at 718, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 245.
51. CAL. EVID. CODE § 801(a) limits expert opinion testimony to subjects "sufficiently beyond
common experience that the opinion of an expert would assist the trier offacts." (Italics added by the
McDonald court.) According to the court, the statute does not flatly limit expert testimony to sub-
jects "beyond common experience." Rather, the italicized portions of the statute show that admissi-
bility is a question of degree, and the "jury need not be wholly ignorant of the subject matter of the
opinion in order to justify its admission." 37 Cal. 3d at 367, 690 P.2d at 720, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 247.
52. At trial, the prosecution presented seven eyewitnesses who identified defendant as the of-
fender with varying degrees of certainty, and one eyewitness who categorically testified that defend-
ant was not the offender. The defense presented six alibi witnesses, two of whom were unrelated to
the defendant. The defendant also introduced into evidence letters and a telephone bill tending to
show that he was in another state on the day of the crime.
53. United States v. Smith, 736 F.2d 1103 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 868 (1984) (dis-
cussed supra note 10); State v. Contreras, 674 P.2d 792, 822 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983) (dictum), rev'd
on other grounds, 718 P.2d 129 (Alaska 1986).
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and interstate transportation of stolen property. All counts of the indict-
ment arose from a scheme to defraud numerous vendors by a group of
individuals calling themselves the Universal League of Clergy (U.L.C.).
U.L.C. sent representatives, identifying themselves as U.L.C. clergy, to
national trade shows where they expressed interest in the product lines of
various manufacturers. When a vendor took an order for his product,
the U.L.C. representative would provide the vendor with a list of non-
existent credit references. U.L.C. established mail drops where it col-
lected inquiries sent by the credit departments of the manufacturers.
U.L.C. itself then provided positive credit reports to the manufacturers,
who then shipped the goods to U.L.C. on credit. U.L.C. disposed of the
goods without making payment to the manufacturers. One of the U.L.C.
representatives involved in these transactions identified himself as Rever-
end Claymore.
54
The government's case against Downing consisted primarily of the
testimony of twelve eyewitnesses who, with varying degrees of confi-
dence, testified that the defendant was the man they knew as Reverend
Claymore. Those witnesses personally observed Claymore for periods
ranging from five to forty-five minutes during the course of business deal-
ings that later were discovered to be fraudulent. Downing contended
that he was not Reverend Claymore and that the eyewitnesses were
mistaken. 5
5
The defense proffered the testimony of a psychologist on the unrelia-
bility of eyewitness identification. After a brief on-the-record discussion,
the district court denied the motion to permit the expert to testify on the
ground that it is the function of the jury to determine the credibility of
witnesses. 56 Defendant was convicted and he appealed, asserting that the
district court's exclusion of his expert's testimony was erroneous and
harmful within the meaning of Federal Rule of Evidence 103(a). 57
REASONING OF THE COURT
The Third Circuit formulated the issue presented by the appeal as
follows: "whether Fed. R. Evid. 702 permits a defendant in a criminal
prosecution to adduce, from an expert in the field of human perception
and memory, testimony concerning the reliability of eyewitness identifi-
54. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1227.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1228.
57. FED. R. EVID. 103(a) provides: "Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits
or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected .... '?
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cations." 58 The court answered yes, and further held that the admission
of such testimony is not automatic but conditional.5 9 The court essen-
tially conducted a two-part inquiry. First, it addressed the question of
whether Rule 702 ever permits the introduction of expert psychological
testimony.6° Second, the court addressed the question of when such tes-
timony is admissible, i.e., the "conditions" under which a district court
should admit the testimony. 61 Under this second inquiry, the court fash-
ioned its standard for evaluating novel scientific evidence, including ex-
pert psychological testimony.62 These two inquiries are considered
separately below.
The "Helpfulness" Standard of Rule 702
The court began its analysis by examining the reason the district
court gave for excluding the testimony-namely, that credibility is a
question for the jury. Although the district court did not discuss Rule
702, the appellate court thought that the court's ruling excluding the
testimony was based on an erroneous interpretation of Rule 702. Ac-
cording to the appellate court, the district court in effect concluded that
expert testimony on eyewitness identifications is never admissible in fed-
eral court "because such testimony concerns a matter of common experi-
ence that the jury is itself presumed to possess."'6 3 Under that
interpretation, expert psychological testimony can never meet Rule 702's
test for the admissibility of expert testimony. 64
The Third Circuit rejected the foregoing interpretation, pointing to
the fact that Rule 702 favors the admissibility of relevant expert testi-
mony. 65 Despite this policy of liberal admissibility, the court noted that
several circuit courts of appeals have upheld the exclusion of expert psy-
chological testimony. 66 The court doubted whether the conclusion
58. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1226.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1228-32.
61. Id. at 1232-43.
62. Id. at 1237.
63. Id. at 1229.
64. Id.
65. The court relied on the Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 702, supra note 11, and on case
law, including In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 279 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986).
It is generally agreed that the Rules on expert testimony favor admissibility. See, e.g., 3 J. WEIN-
STEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 702[0], at 702-14 (1985) ("Because of the Federal
Rules' emphasis on liberalizing expert testimony, doubts about whether an expert's testimony will be
useful should generally be resolved in favor of admissibility .... ").
66. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1229-30. See supra note 8 for recent decisions upholding the exclu-
sion of the expert testimony at issue.
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reached by those courts "is consistent with the liberal standard of admis-
sibility mandated by Rule 702."67 Instead, it found persuasive the deci-
sions in State v. Chapple,68 United States v. Smith, 69 and People v.
McDonald,70 which the court in Downing discussed rather briefly. The
court agreed with jurisdictions holding that expert psychologists can ex-
plain to the jury factors affecting perception and memory which the aver-
age juror does not necessarily understand. 7' Thus, expert psychological
testimony can assist the jury in reaching a correct decision, and therefore
it may meet the helpfulness test of Rule 702.72
Finally, the court acknowledged the judicial resistance to expert
psychological testimony, due to its novelty and the fear of trial delay.
However, the court concluded, "[t]he logic of Fed. R. Evid. 702 is inexo-
rable, . . . and requires, as the Smith, Chapple, and McDonald courts
recognized, that expert testimony on eyewitness perception and memory
be admitted at least in some circumstances.
'73
The Standard for Evaluating Novel Scientific Evidence
The court then turned to the second part of its analysis, comprising
the bulk of its opinion, in which it set forth its standard for evaluating
novel scientific evidence.
First, the court discussed the evidentiary problems posed by novel
forms of scientific expertise and analyzed the Frye74 test, which attempts
to deal with those problems. The court noted that courts and commenta-
tors are divided over the issue of the foundational requirements for the
admission of scientific testimony.75 After describing the two opposing
views on whether the Frye test survived the enactment of the Federal
Rules of Evidence,76 the court concluded that the Rules neither incorpo-
67. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1230.
68. 135 Ariz. 281, 660 P.2d 1208 (1983).
69. 736 F.2d 1103 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 213 (1984).
70. 37 Cal. 3d 351, 690 P.2d 709, 208 Cal. Rptr. 236 (1984).
71. The court gave as an example the situation in Chapple, where the two eyewitnesses viewed
the murders under the belief that they might soon become victims as well. Most people probably
believe that stress increases the accuracy of one's perception; eyewitnesses, and particularly victims,
frequently testify to the effect that "I will never forget that person's face." However, studies indicate
that the exact opposite is true. Thus, the court in Downing noted, the effect of stress on the eyewit-
nesses in Chapple was certainly relevant to an evaluation of the reliability of their identifications, and
the expert's testimony, if reliable, would have assisted the jury. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1231-32.
72. Id. at 1232.
73. Id.
74. United States v. Frye, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). See supra notes 27-35 and accompany-
ing text for a discussion of the Frye test.
75. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1232.
76. Those two views are set forth supra note 30.
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rated nor repudiated the test. 77 The court then analyzed the Frye test. It
noted that critics of the test have cited two general problems with it: its
vagueness78 and its conservatism. 79 Ultimately, the court squarely re-
jected the Frye test "as an independent controlling standard of admissi-
bility"80 because of those two problems. Instead, according to the Third
Circuit, a particular degree of acceptance of a scientific technique within
the scientific community is simply one factor that a district court should
consider in deciding whether to admit evidence based upon the
technique 81
The court then fashioned its alternative standard, derived from the
helpfulness standard of Rule 702. According to the court, its standard is
consistent with the language and spirit of the Federal Rules and has the
advantage of flexibility.8 2  Under the Third Circuit's standard, the dis-
trict court should conduct a preliminary inquiry on the admissibility of
novel scientific evidence. This inquiry should focus on the following
three factors.
The first factor is the soundness and reliability of the process or
technique used in generating the evidence. The court noted that a
number of recent cases have focused on reliability of the evidence as a
critical element of admissibility.8 3 The court emphasized that in contrast
to what it called the "nose-counting" approach required by the Frye stan-
dard, the reliability inquiry envisioned by the court is flexible and may
turn on a number of considerations.8 4
The second factor is the possibility that admitting the evidence
would overwhelm or mislead the jury. Thus, after assessing the reliabil-
77. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1235.
78. The court, primarily relying on Professor Giannelli's article (supra note 28), discussed the
vagueness criticism. The vague terms of the test have allowed courts to manipulate the parameters
of the relevant "scientific community" and the level of agreement needed for "general acceptance,"
leading to inconsistent results. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1236.
79. For example, one commentator maintains that jurisdictions following Frye will always lag
behind advances in science. Lacey, Scientific Evidence, 24 JURIMETRICS J. 254, 265 (1984), cited in
Downing, 753 F.2d at 1237.
80. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1237.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1238. Among the cases cited by the court is State v. Kersting, 50 Or. App. 461, 623
P.2d 1095, 1101 (1981) (novel scientific evidence may be admitted if there is credible evidence from
which the trial judge may make a determination that the technique is reasonably reliable), aff'd, 292
Or. 350, 638 P.2d 1145 (1982).
84. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1238. The court referred to a list of such considerations compiled by
Judge Weinstein and Professor Berger which may guide the district court in its determination of the
reliability of evidence. These considerations include the following: (1) the relationship of the new
technique to more established modes of scientific analysis; (2) the existence of a specialized literature
on the subject; and (3) the frequency with which a technique leads to erroneous results. Id. at 1238-
39 (citing 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE 702[03], at 702-18 to -20).
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ity of the evidence, the district court must then balance that assessment
against the danger that the evidence, though reliable, might confuse or
mislead the jury.
85
The third factor is the "fit," i.e., "the proffered connection between
the scientific research or test result to be presented and particular dis-
puted factual issues in the case."'8 6 The court explained the "fit" factor
as ensuring that the proffered testimony is sufficiently tied to the facts so
as to aid the jury in resolving a factual dispute.87 Finally, the district
court retains discretion under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 to exclude
relevant evidence that would unduly waste time or confuse the issues. 88
After setting forth the above standard, the Third Circuit expressly
left for the trial court's determination whether or not the expert testi-
mony should be admitted in Downing on remand. The appellate court
did, however, make the following observations. It appeared to the court
that the scientific basis for the expert testimony in question is sufficiently
reliable to satisfy Rule 702.89 The court cited the McDonald case, which
had reviewed the professional literature on the subject and concluded
that "the consistency of the results of these studies is impressive." 90
With respect to the factor described by the court as the "fit," on remand
the defendant's offer of proof should establish the presence of factors
which researchers have found impair the accuracy of eyewitness identifi-
cations.91 The court pointed to both McDonald and Chapple which also
required this connection between the expert testimony and the facts of
the case.92 Finally, while the balancing test of Rule 403 may justify ex-
clusion in a given case, the court clearly rejected the notion that the pros-
pect of a "battle of the experts" in every criminal case in itself justifies the
exclusion of expert testimony on eyewitness identification.93
The court vacated the judgment of conviction and remanded. Be-
cause the crucial evidence against the defendant consisted solely of eye-
85. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1239-40.
86. Id. at 1237.
87. Id. at 1242.
88. Id. at 1242-43. FED. R. EVID. 403 provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be ex-
cluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion
of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence."
89. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1241.
90. People v. McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d at 365, 690 P.2d at 718, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 245, cited in
Downing, 753 F.2d at 1242.
91. For example, if the eyewitness and the defendant are of different races, that fact would be
sufficiently tied to one of the psychological factors that has been found to affect the reliability of
eyewitness identifications to satisfy the "fit" factor. See Downing, 753 F.2d at 1242.
92. Id. See also supra note 71.
93. 753 F.2d at 1243 n.27.
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witness testimony, the district court's error in excluding the expert
testimony could not be deemed harmless.
94
ANALYSIS
The courts have long recognized the hazards of eyewitness identifi-
cations. 95 In fact, those who oppose the use of expert testimony on the
subject point to that fact as support for their position: since "everybody
knows" that witnesses can be mistaken, there is no need for an expert to
testify to that phenomenon. 96 However, that position ignores three im-
portant considerations: (1) the fact that eyewitness testimony is so pow-
erful that it can cause a jury to disregard other exculpatory evidence, a
fact that has been noted by courts97 and is supported by psychological
research; 98 (2) the existence of numerous scientific studies that indicate
that several factors affecting perception, memory and recall are not
known to the average juror and in fact are contrary to commonly-held
intuitive beliefs; 99 and (3) the obvious importance of what is at stake-
the liberty and even life of the defendant on trial.
94. Id. at 1243-44. Judge Dumbauld concurred in the disposition of the case, inasmuch as the
district court remained free on remand to exclude the evidence. He also agreed that there can be
cases where the expert testimony at issue may be useful. But with respect to the case at bar, it
seemed plain to him that any error was harmless. He contrasted the facts in Downing, where the
eyewitnesses had spent five to forty-five minutes with "Reverend Claymore" during business transac-
tions, with situations involving a momentary glance of a bank robber or a rape perpetrated under a
ski mask. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1244 (Dumbauld, J., concurring).
It is indeed surprising that the Third Circuit chose to announce its new rule on the facts
presented in Downing. A more compelling fact situation was presented to the Third Circuit in
United States v. Sebetich, 776 F.2d 412 (3d Cir. 1985). In that case, the eyewitness, a police officer,
viewed the person whom he later identified at trial under the following circumstances. The police
officer was pursuing a robbery suspect at speeds ranging from forty to seventy-five miles per hour.
During the chase, the suspect shot at the officer several times; a fragment of one of the bullets
pierced the officer's left shoulder. The officer's first identification of defendant Sebetich as the man
who had fired at him during the chase was made a year and half after the incident. The govern-
ment's case against Sebetich rested exclusively on the officer's identification.
The defendant sought to introduce the testimony of an expert who would have testified to the
effects of stress and the lapse of time on the reliability of eyewitness identifications. The trial court
excluded the testimony. (Downing was decided after Sebetich's trial.) On appeal, the Third Circuit
vacated the judgment of conviction and remanded the case for a hearing to determine the admissibil-
ity of the expert testimony under the standard set forth in Downing. Sebetich, 776 F.2d 412, 415.
95. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
96. See, e.g., the following statement by Irving Younger, quoted in Greene, Schooler, & Loftus,
Expert Psychological Testimony in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EVIDENCE AND TRIAL PROCEDURE 201,
201 (1985):
Do you really think that the social scientists have discovered something new? Go home
and ask your grandmother from Poland or your uncle from Armenia, who didn't get past
third grade. Ask them and you'll have the answer. Grandmother will tell you, uncle will
tell you, "Sure, perception is different, memories falter, speech fails, bias and prejudice
must be allowed for, and liars exist."
97. See supra note 16.
98. See E. LoFTus, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 19 (1979).
99. See supra text accompanying note 18.
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While the courts have articulated a number of reasons for excluding
expert psychological testimony, 10° the primary rationales are that credi-
bility is to be determined by the jury, that the subject matter is not be-
yond the knowledge and experience of the jury, and that the testimony
would invade the province of the jury. Significantly, however, a review
of the case law expressing the traditional view reveals, in the main, an
uncritical acceptance of these rationales. The courts rarely analyze the
issue; more often, they simply repeat the reasons that have been given by
other courts and note that this is the uniform view among the circuits. '0'
Of course, it is no longer a uniform view. The recent decisions which
have reached the opposite conclusion have correctly inquired whether
the judicial reluctance to admit such testimony remains justified. 10 2
The major significance of the Downing decision is that it correctly
recognized that expert psychological testimony is admissible under the
helpfulness test of Rule 702. The Downing court properly focused its
analysis on what would seem to be the obvious starting point: the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence which address expert testimony. Surprisingly,
most appellate court decisions representing the traditional view do not
focus on the applicable Rules and their policy of liberal admissibility. 10 3
In examining the Federal Rules and their legislative history, the
Downing court first correctly noted that since Rule 704 abolished the
"ultimate issue rule," expert psychological testimony cannot be deemed
inadmissible on the ground that credibility is an ultimate issue. '4 More
importantly, the court examined the district court's rationale that expert
testimony on eyewitness identification is never admissible because it con-
cerns a matter of common experience and therefore it can never meet
Rule 702's test. In rejecting that rationale, the Third Circuit relied on
the language of the Rule and the Advisory Committee's Note. 0 5 These
sources could not be any clearer on the test for admissibility, nor on the
fact that the Rule contemplates a broad construction and liberal
admissibility.
The court also implicitly and correctly recognized that Rule 702
100. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
101. See, e.g., United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 641 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1008
(1982).
102. See People v. McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d 351, 365, 690 P.2d 709, 718, 208 Cal. Rptr. 236, 245
(1984).
103. This may be partially explained, however, by the fact that the standard of review on eviden-
tiary rulings is the abuse of discretion standard, and thus appellate courts tend to defer to trial
courts' determinations without conducting in-depth analyses. See id. at 365 n.10, 690 P.2d at 718
n.10, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 245 n.10.
104. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1229.
105. See supra note 11.
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does not require that the subject matter of the testimony be completely
outside the experience of the jury, when it quoted one of the leading trea-
tises on evidence: "an expert can be employed if his testimony will be
helpful to the trier of fact in understanding evidence that is simply diffi-
cult, [though] not beyond ordinary understanding."' 10 6 The court cor-
rectly concluded that the traditional view which rejects expert testimony
on eyewitness identification is plainly inconsistent with the liberal stan-
dard of admisibility mandated by Rule 702.
Perhaps the biggest obstacle standing in the way of judicial accept-
ance of expert psychological testimony is the conclusory argument that
such testimony would invade the province of the jury. The Third Circuit
in Downing only briefly addressed this argument. However, the McDon-
ald decision, whose rationale the Downing court followed, thoroughly an-
alyzed that argument and demonstrated its fallibility. The argument is
that to admit expert psychological testimony would take over the jury's
task of determining credibility "-or, to put it in the more colorful lan-
guage of legal clich6 used by many courts, would 'invade the province' or
'usurp the function' of the jury."' 0 7 The McDonald court agreed with
Wigmore who said that such language "is so misleading, as well as un-
sound, that it should be entirely repudiated. It is a mere bit of empty
rhetoric." 
0 8
As the McDonald court correctly stated, the invasion of the prov-
ince of the jury rationale is unsound for the following reasons. First,
expert psychological testimony does not seek to take over the jury's func-
tion of judging credibility: it does not tell the jury that any particular
witness is or is not accurate in his identification. Rather, the expert in-
forms the jury of certain factors that may affect such an identification. 10 9
Second, the expert testimony could not in fact usurp the jury's function.
As is true with all expert testimony, the jury remains free to reject it
entirely. 10 Finally, California, like the Federal Rules, has abolished the
"ultimate issue rule."' l The Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 704 is
106. S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 451 (3d ed.
1982), quoted in Downing, 753 F.2d at 1229. Accord People v. McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d at 367, 690
P.2d at 720, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 247 (admissibility is a question of degree; the jury need not be wholly
ignorant of the subject for the testimony to be admissible).
107. 37 Cal. 3d at 370, 690 P.2d at 722, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 249.
108. 7 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1920 (Chadbourn rev. 1978), quoted in McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d at
370, 690 P.2d at 722, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 249. See also P. WALL, EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION IN
CRIMINAL CASES 213 (1965) ("the objection based upon the 'province of the jury' is no more than a
shibboleth which, if accepted, would deprive the jury of important information useful or perhaps
necessary for a proper decision on a difficult issue").
109. McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d at 370-71, 690 P.2d at 722, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 248.
110. Id.
Ill. Id. at 371, 690 P.2d at 723, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 250.
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instructive on this point. It states that the helpfulness standards of Rule
702, and Rule 403, "afford ample assurances against the admission of
opinions which would merely tell the jury what result to reach." Expert
psychological testimony certainly does not tell the jury what result to
reach, but rather provides it with information that may be useful in de-
ciding the issue of identification.
The Downing court, after holding that Rule 702 permits the intro-
duction of expert testimony on eyewitness identification, fashioned its
standard for evaluating all types of novel scientific evidence. In this re-
spect, the Third Circuit went beyond Chapple and McDonald, which
only addressed the narrow issue of whether expert psychological testi-
mony should have been admitted in the particular case. At the same
time, it is curious that the Third Circuit, although "persuaded by" the
approach in those two cases, did not, unlike those cases, determine that
the expert testimony at issue is reliable enough to be admissible. Instead,
the district court is free to determine the reliability of expert psychologi-
cal testimony in each case. The Third Circuit did not explain why it took
this approach, except to say that the record before it was inadequately
developed.
Adjudication on a case by case basis obviously is not unusual; how-
ever, a case by case approach is usually taken where the fact patterns are
likely to be quite varied. It would seem that the reliability of the evi-
dence in question, i.e., the factors affecting perception, memory, and re-
call, is not going to change significantly from case to case. A possible
result of the Third Circuit's approach is inconsistent rulings by the dis-
trict courts on the reliability of identical testimony.
On the other hand, it may be that some of the factors on which an
expert proposes to testify have been the subject of more research and
hence are possibly more reliable than other factors. For example, it ap-
pears that the "own-race effect" factor has been studied more extensively
than some of the other factors.' 12 Since obviously there is no "track rec-
ord" yet, under the approach taken either by the McDonald court or the
Downing court, it is difficult to predict which approach will prove to be
the better one. Additionally, because the Downing court placed heavy
emphasis on tying the facts of the case to the specific factors on which the
112. See Johnson, supra note 7, for a comprehensive review of scientific studies on the own-race
effect. The author suggests that testimony on this factor is more reliable than testimony on other
factors, such as the feedback factor, because the own-race effect has been studied more extensively.
She concludes that "[u]nlike expert testimony on many other sources of identification error, testi-
mony concerning the own-race effect so clearly meets evidentiary standards that permitting trial
court discretion to determine its admissibility is unjustified." Id. at 986.
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expert will testify, the differing approaches taken by the McDonald and
Downing courts may not be so divergent as they seem.
In any event, the major significance of Downing is that it removed
the largest obstacle to the admission of expert psychological testimony by
holding that such testimony may assist the jury and thus is admissible
under Rule 702. The impact of the Downing decision may be less than it
at first appears, since the experts themselves disagree over whether such
testimony should be admitted.' 1 3 Nevertheless, the decision is another
"chink in the armor" of judicial hostility toward expert psychological
testimony and is commendable for a number of reasons.
First, and perhaps most importantly, Downing focuses on a legal
analysis and reexamines (and exposes the fallacies of) the reasons com-
monly advanced for the previously unanimous view on the issue. In ac-
cord with this focus, it properly relegates to a footnote what may be the
real reason for the majority view: courts do not want to be bothered with
such testimony. The court acknowledged the concerns that every crimi-
nal case would be turned into a "battle of the experts" and of the pros-
pect of a new "cottage industry" of psychological experts. The court
responded: "We are sympathetic to these concerns but are not moved by
the legal point . . . if the testimony is highly probative and meets the
conditions set forth above . . . the parties are entitled to present it,
whether or not it adds to the length of the trial .... "114
The court's response is entirely correct. Adequate measures exist to
ensure that some courts' dire predictions will not come to pass. The trial
court is required, under the court's standard, to balance the reliability of
the testimony against any danger of misleading the jury, and it retains
discretion under Rule 403 to exclude it entirely, or to limit the number of
experts and the length of their testimony. Moreover, the "floodgates"
argument overlooks the fact that courts have traditionally been reluctant
113. As noted supra note 15, Drs. McCloskey and Egeth maintain that expert psychological
testimony should not be presented to the trier of fact. See Egeth & McCloskey, Expert Testimony
About Eyewitness Behavior: Is It Safe and Effective?, in PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note
15, at 283. Rebuttal arguments from the "Loftus group" are found in Greene, Schooler, & Loftus,
Expert Psychological Testimony, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EVIDENCE & TRIAL PROCEDURE 200,
212-22 (1985).
The court in McDonald addressed the position taken by McCloskey & Egeth. The court said
that it appears that the main complaint of those psychologists is not so much that the expert testi-
mony "should never be admissible, as that it is too soon to admit it: additional research is needed."
The court observed that "this is a frequent conclusion of academic authors .... appellate judges do
not have the luxury of waiting until their colleagues in the sciences unanimously agree that on a
particular issue no more research is necessary. Given the nature of the scientific endeavor, that day
may never come." People v. McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d 351, 369 n.15, 690 P.2d 709, 721 n.15, 208 Cal.
Rptr. 236, 248 n.15 (1984).
114. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1243 n.27.
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to admit this testimony, and there is no reason to think this attitude will
change overnight. In short, the Downing court has indeed "opened the
door," but not the "floodgates."
Second, the court properly rejected the Frye test. As Professor Gi-
annelli persuasively demonstrates, 15 that test has produced anomalous
results and is simply unworkable. Third, the court's alternate standard
for evaluating novel scientific evidence sets up a workable framework for
trial courts without sacrificing flexibility. Novel scientific evidence does
present unique problems, and the court struck a proper balance between
the policy of the Federal Rules, favoring the admissibility of probative
evidence, and the danger of admitting unreliable evidence. Finally, the
decision reflects a healthy openness to new scientific evidence on an issue
of critical importance to criminal defendants.
CONCLUSION
The Downing decision represents a significant departure from the
formerly unanimous view that the exclusion of expert testimony on eye-
witness identification is not an abuse of discretion. The Third Circuit
joined a small minority of jurisdictions in holding that, under the helpful-
ness test of Federal Rule of Evidence 702, such expert testimony is ad-
missible under certain circumstances. The court fashioned a flexible
standard for evaluating novel scientific evidence which is consistent with
the policies underlying the Federal Rules, properly rejecting the vague
Frye standard.
The court did not determine whether expert psychological testi-
mony is sufficiently reliable to be admissible, but rather left that determi-
nation to the trial court; it held only that Rule 702 is not a bar to
admissibility. In that sense, the impact of the decision may be less than it
at first appears, given the traditional judicial reluctance to admit the tes-
timony. Nevertheless, the decision is significant in that it squarely rejects
the notion that because credibility is an issue to be decided by the jury,
expert testimony offered to aid the jury in evaluating eyewitness testi-
mony is inadmissible. In holding that expert psychological testimony
may assist the trier of fact, the Third Circuit has taken a significant step
toward correcting the serious problem of mistaken identifications and
wrongful convictions.
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115. Giannelli, supra note 28.
